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INTRODUCTION 
It is almost1 15 years since2 Indonesia 
adopted the decentralization policy. Initially, 
there was pessimism regarding the future suc-
cess of the policy, given the large transfer of 
functions from central to local governments with 
a lack of preparation and proper sequencing. 
Due to its scale and speed, Indonesian decen-
tralization has been called Big Bang decentra-
lization. These are highlights of the decentrali-
zation as it occurred in its initial stages: 
• The policy involved significant devolution of 
the responsibilities from central to local gov-
ernments. Only a few responsibilities were 
retained by Central Government, namely: 
defense, foreign affairs, security, religious 
affairs, fiscal and monetary affairs, and jus-
tice. 
• A significant fiscal transfer was allocated 
from the central to local governments. Most 
of them were general purpose grants, and a 
only small portion was considered to be spe-
cific grants. This situation was different from 
how it was during the Soeharto era, when it 
was dominated by specific grants called 
Inpres (Presidential Instructions). 
• Over 2 million civil servants, or almost two-
thirds of the central government workforce, 
1  The earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the 4th Research Meeting on Asia Decentralization, 
GRIPS, Tokyo, Japan, in January 2015. The Author 
would like to thank Prof. Hiroshi Ikawa and the 
participants at the meeting for useful comments. 
2  B. Raksaka Mahi is a Senior Lecturer, Department 
of Economics, University of Indonesia. 
mostly were teachers and health workers, 
were transferred to the regions. 
Despite its Big Bang nature, the Indonesian 
decentralization process was praised for its 
implementation steps, as mentioned by Hofman 
and Kaiser (2002): “Surprisingly little went 
wrong in the logistics of this radical, hastily pre-
pared move.” The initial steps of decentraliza-
tion were the key for Indonesia to avoid failures 
when adopting the Big Bang decentralization. As 
pointed out by Koichi Mera (2004): “One reason 
for the country being able to avoid catastrophes 
was the incremental adjustments the Central 
Government adopted during the process, such as 
its decision to bear the cost of the transferred 
civil servants in the initial years.” 
Law No.22/1999, which guided the process 
of devolution and the local autonomy, was 
endorsed by the Parliament in 1999. The first 
revision of the law took place in 2004, and the 
latest version was passed by the Parliament in 
2014. The revised law, known as Law No.23/ 
2014, came with attachments describing a clear 
division of the responsibilities between all gov-
ernment levels. This gives certainty to the local 
governments regarding their responsibilities. 
Historically this law was accompanied by the 
Law on the Central-Local Fiscal Balance. At 
present, this law is still in the process of revision 
and the new version is expected to be issued by 
2016. The Central-Local Balance Law regulates 
the fiscal decentralization process and regulation 
in Indonesia. 
The co-existence of the two laws shows that, 
to some extent, Indonesia has adopted the prin-
ciple of “money follows functions” by which the 
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functions are first decentralized and then fol-
lowed by the fiscal allocation to finance those 
decentralized functions. A good implementation 
of this principle requires the adoption of a stan-
dard spending assessment. In an advanced coun-
try, such as the United Kingdom, the central 
government assistance to local government has 
already been implemented through the Standard 
Spending Assessment (SSA) for a long time, 
which is intended to reflect the spending needs 
of each local authority. In the United Kingdom, 
the total SSA is calculated for each local author-
ity and is built up from component parts for each 
service the authority provides, such as education 
or social services. The SSA calculation is broken 
down between the different services provided by 
those responsible localy, and this requires good 
information and measurement for each local 
government service as a base for allocating the 
transfer. 
Since such data were not available to calcu-
late the SSA, especially during the first year of 
implementation of the fiscal decentralization, the 
fiscal transfer to the local government in Indo-
nesia was allocated based on the fiscal gap 
method which involves the difference between 
fiscal capacity and fiscal needs. Both fiscal 
needs and capacity were calculated based on 
indicators, such as population, area, poverty, 
local GDP, and the actual total revenue from 
local owned revenue and local shared revenue.  
The initial motivation of decentralization 
was highly affected by political reform and 
democracy, which led to the local direct elec-
tions. The early version of the law on local gov-
ernment stipulates the regulations regarding 
these elections. In 2014, the issues pertaining to 
local direct elections were separated from the 
law on local government and became a standa-
lone law, namely Law No.1/ 2015. 
The focus of local government law has grad-
ually changed to improving local public services, 
hence the local welfare. Better local administra-
tion and management are important to meet this 
objective. Under the scheme of Indonesian 
decentralization, significant basic instruments, 
namely responsibilities, human resources 
(administrative officials, teachers and health 
workers) and financial transfer were already in 
the hands of the local government. The head of 
local government is responsible for managing all 
of these transfers to empower the local economy. 
This is to show that the economic authority is 
basically also decentralized. We can conclude 
that Indonesian decentralization basically relies 
on four main pillars (Figure 1): (1) Politics, (2) 
Fiscal Matters, (3) Administration and (4) Eco-
nomic Decentralization. 
 
 
Source: Grand Design of Fiscal Decentralization (Ministry of Finance, 2008) 
Figure 1. Four Pillars of Indonesian Decentralization 
Economic 
Decentralization 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
Political 
Decentralization 
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The objective of this paper is to evaluate the 
implementation of Indonesian decentralization. 
The rest of this paper discusses the evaluation of 
decentralization policy in Indonesia, especially 
in the area of local leadership and direct elec-
tions, welfare and regional disparities, and 
budget quality.  
This paper also provides highlights of recent 
movement in the decentralization laws, namely 
the revision of the law on local government and 
the issuance of the new village law. Finally, the 
paper ends with a discussion on the future chal-
lenge of decentralization in Indonesia. 
EVALUATION OF CURRENT 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Along with the transfer of responsibilities to 
the local government, there is an expectation that 
the decentralization policy could provide better 
local public services. Indicators related to the 
economic growth and welfare could be used to 
monitor the welfare improvement in the regions 
after decentralization. The ability of local leaders 
plays an important role in managing decentrali-
zation. Strong local leadership, a pro-business 
environment and good management of the public 
budget are essentials of the local leader. 
Along with the implementation of decentra-
lization, some issues have raised concerns, 
namely the asymmetric decentralization and 
regional disparities. These issues must be very 
carefully assessed as these may hamper the 
decentralization policy results.  
1.  Regional Economic Growth  
Indonesia experienced a deep crisis in 1998. 
Not only did it affect the national economy, it 
also had a significant impact on regional econo-
mies. Regions also experienced a significant 
decrease in economic growth during the crisis, 
especially in Java. The weakening of the Indo-
nesian Rupiah has made exported commodities 
cheaper, which benefited regions with these 
commodities. Their increasing exports abroad 
have driven positive economic growth rate dur-
ing the crisis time. 
Decentralization has given the local govern-
ment stronger authority to manage and to im-
prove the performance of local economies. As 
seen in Table 1, some regions managed to 
recover from the crisis earlier than other regions, 
and some of them had higher growth than the 
national average. 
Some provinces, particularly those located 
outside Java and Sumatra, have enjoyed high 
economic growth rates since decentralization, 
namely: Gorontalo, Jambi, Southeast Sulawesi, 
West Sulawesi and West Papua. Unfortunately, 
natural resource provinces tend to experience 
lower growth compared to the national average, 
such as East Kalimantan and Riau. 
2.  Local Welfare and Local Budgets 
Another measurement to reflect welfare is 
the Human Development Index (HDI) which, 
according to the definition of the UNDP, is a 
summary measure of average achievement in 
key dimensions of human development: a long 
and healthy life, being knowledgeable and hav-
ing a decent standard of living. The HDI is the 
geometric mean of normalized indices for each 
of the three dimensions.There are many factors 
affecting changes in the HDI, among others is 
the local government achievement in providing 
good public facilities, such as education and 
health.  
An observation of the HDI’s changes 
between 1999 (before decentralization) and 2011 
(after eleven years of implementing decentrali-
zation) shows that almost 50% of all districts 
and municipalities have an increase in the HDI 
by five to ten percent (Table 2). Only a few of 
them have seen the HDI increase by less than 
five percent. Another forty percent of districts 
and municipalities have their HDI increased by 
twenty percent or more. Increases in the HDI 
may indicate that some positive progress has 
been made in managing education and health 
services.As we know, the measurement of the 
HDI depends particularly on 3 (three) indicating 
variables, namely income per capita, educational 
participation and reduction on infant mortality 
rate (as measurement of the health index in 
HDI). 
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Table 2. Number of Municipalities and Districts 
with HDI Changes 
(From 1999 to 2011) 
Changes of the HDI Number of Regions 
% of 
Total 
Decrease 
Increase less than 5% 
Increase between 5 – 10% 
Increase between 10 – 15% 
Increase between 15 - 20% 
Increase above 20 % 
0 
4 
226 
37 
8 
178 
0 
0.88 % 
49.89 % 
8.17% 
1.77% 
39.29% 
TOTAL 453 100 
Source: Calculated from the HDI data. 
The increased focus of the local government 
on these sectors can be seen from the budget 
allocation, which increased consistently and sig-
nificantly for these sectors after decentralization 
(Table 3).  
However, we need to understand that, for the 
education sector, the increased portion of its 
budget does not solely result from the decisions 
of the local government; it is also influenced by 
the education law, which mandated every gov-
ernment to have at least twenty percent alloca-
tion for education. 
Table 3. Basic Sectors in Local Budget 
Sector 
Year 
1999/2000 2013 
Provinces   
Agriculture 2.12 2.58 
Transportation 8.09 2.94 
Education 3.8 8.75 
Health 3.11 8.22 
Districts/Municipalities 
  Agriculture 1.47 2.16 
Transportation 7.64 1.30 
Education 3.25 33.31 
Health 1.53 9.74 
Source: Calculated from the data of Ministry of Finance 
3.   Local Leadership and Business Environ-
ment 
The policy of decentralization forces the 
local government to improve the local business 
environment. Everywhere, local government has 
created a “pro-business” environment in its 
region; such as simplifying the process of start-
ing a business. This action has benefited the 
local economy, as the “pro-business” action 
attracts Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
There are, however, some local leaders who 
failed to manage their local economy. Instead of 
working on simplifying the regulations, these 
leaders created cumbersome local regulations, 
which hamper the local business climate. Inves-
tors have moved away from such regions, and 
this is slowing the economic growth rate in those 
regions.  
A simple regression analysis on provincial 
investment data has proven that “pro-business” 
regions could attract more investment. Provinces 
with less nuisance regulations are generally 
more attractive for investment. 
As summarized in Table 4, there are some 
positive factors affecting the investment flow to 
a province, such as the size of the economy, 
population size and local taxes. On the other 
hand, there are also negative factors affecting 
investment flow, such as the availability of the 
infrastructures (road and electricity) and the 
number of nuisance regulations. Negative signs 
about infrastructure showing that its quality is 
not good is an impediment to investment. The 
existence of the nuisance regulations, derived 
mainly from bad local tax and user charges, also 
has a negative impact on investment. 
Understanding the negative impact of the 
nuisance local tax regulations, the old law on 
local tax and user charges has been revoked, and 
replaced by Law No.28/20009. The new revised 
law adopts the positive list method; meaning that 
local governments are permitted to collect taxes 
and user charges, only if those are stipulated in 
the Law. 
4.  Asymmetric Decentralization 
Asymmetric decentralization is found in 
which different constituent sub-nationals given 
different powers: one or more sub-national has 
considerably more autonomy than the others, 
although they have the same constitutional sta-
tus. This is in contrast to symmetric decentrali-
zation, where the policy does not make a dis-
tinction between constituent regions. 
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Table 4. The Summary of Factors Affecting Provincial Investment (2006) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat significance 
ln y 0.888 5.9 ** 
ln N 0.362 2.41 ** 
ln tax 0.693 5.39 ** 
lninf_road -1.23 -1.62 
 lninf_elec -0.0013 -0.99 
 ln Nr -0.704 -1.82 * 
Const -0.736 -0.49 
 Notes: 
** = Significance at the level of 5 % 
*   = Significance at the level of 10 % 
A short description of the Model to estimate factors affecting Provincial Investment: 
Y = Provincial GDP **) 
N = Provincial Population **) 
Tax = Percentages of local owned revenue (PAD) to GRDP **) 
Inf_Road = Road Infrastructure (Not Significant) 
Inf_Elec = Electricity (Not significant) 
Nr = Number of nuisance local taxes regulation *) 
The model using Provincial Data of 2006 
  
The asymmetric decentralization approach is 
frequently proposed as a solution to the dissa-
tisfactions that arise when one or two constituent 
units feel significantly different needs from the 
others as a result of an ethnic, linguistic or cul-
tural difference. 
In Indonesia, although the form of state is 
Unitary, four provinces were given the special 
autonomy status; namely Aceh, Jakarta, Yogya-
karta, and Papua. Each province has its own spe-
cial status law which stipulates its degree of 
special autonomy. Each province has been given 
special autonomy funding, in line with its uni-
queness. 
To avoid giving each province special status, 
the asymmetric decentralization policy needs to 
be implemented differently. The uniqueness of a 
region is acknowledged not as an individual 
treatment, rather as a clustered treatment. The 
cluster could be used as additional criteria for 
allocating general purpose grant. For example, 
regions could be distinguished based on the 
urban and rural needs. This implies the general 
purpose grant can be different between urban 
and rural regions. 
5.  Regional Disparity 
The phenomenon of a regional inequality is 
not new for Indonesia. As shown in Table 5, the 
distribution of GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic 
Product) has not changed much since 1970, whe-
reby the largest portion of the GRDP is enjoyed 
by the Java region. could This is because of 
differences in production location for industries 
in Indonesia. Most of production base, which 
usually creates more added value, is still located 
in Java and Sumatra.  
To reduce the regional disparities, there 
should be a change in the economic structure of 
regions outside Java and Sumatra. The govern-
ment should take affirmative action to develop 
more industries outside Java, as these are more 
value-added. There should be a “catch-up” strat-
egy for regions outside Java and Sumatra. The 
availability of the infrastructure, such as rai-
lroads, ports and electricity, outside Java and 
Sumatra, could stimulate the regional economic 
dynamic. Fiscal decentralization policy could 
help the establishment of better infrastructure 
outside Java and Sumatra, formulated through 
the specific grant of DAK (Dana Alokasi Khu-
sus). A recent study by Mahi and Riatu (2015) 
shows that, among the types of transfers, the 
DAK is an effective one to stimulate capital 
expenditure in districts and municipalities. By 
increasing the specific DAK grant, the central 
government could stimulate outer island regions 
to allocate more capital spending for infrastruc-
ture, hence minimizing regional disparity in the 
future. 
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Table 5. Regional GDP Distribution 
 Regional GDP 
Distribution (%) 
1971 1990 2010 
Sumatera 
Jakarta 
Java (w/o Jakarta) & Bali 
Nusa Tenggara 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
Maluku dan Papua 
29.1 
8.7 
47.7 
1.7 
5.2 
5.8 
1.8 
25.3 
12.1 
46.2 
1.3 
9.1 
4.1 
1.9 
23.0 
16.3 
43.1 
1.5 
9.1 
4.6 
2.4 
Source: Mahi and Nazara (2012) 
 
6.  Public Facilities and Their Quality 
The amount of public facilities has increased 
during 1999-2011. However, there is still a 
question about the quality of the facilities. The 
doubts are because the quality of the facilities 
tends to be stagnant or even deteriorated. 
For example, evaluating the condition of 
roads across the regions, despite increases in the 
length of the roads (2001-2009), we could find 
that the quality of roads has hardly changed 
much. The evidence seen in Figure 2 shows that 
good roads still comprise around 30-40% of all 
roads, while the damaged and the poor roads 
(combined) remains at 30-40% of all roads. 
These indicate that decentralization does not 
have an effect on the quality improvement of 
road across Indonesia. The length of roads keeps 
increasing, but on the other hand, there is a lack 
of ability to maintain the roads. 
 
 
 Source: The World Bank 
Figure 2. Road Quality 
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RECENT MOVEMENT ON DECENTRA-
LIZATION 
Recently, there have been some changes to 
decentralization law and regulations. Several 
factors motivated the changes in regulations, 
such as the increasing role of decentralization to 
support national priorities, improvement in the 
bottom-up process and local democracy. 
a) Decentralization as an Instrument to Support 
the Achievement of National Priorities 
Infrastructure availability and poverty allevi-
ation programs are the most important national 
priorities of Indonesia. For infrastructure devel-
opment, the availability of land has become the 
main impediment. A clear responsibility of the 
central and local governments is the land man-
agement that is needed to solve the land availa-
bility problem for infrastructure development. 
Under Indonesian decentralization law, basi-
cally, provincial governments have dual roles as 
an autonomous regional government as well as 
representative of central government in the 
region. The role as the autonomous province is 
mainly to coordinate and to intervene in matters 
that straddle districts and municipalities.  
Its function as the representative of the cen-
tral government are mainly to supervise local 
government to work effectively. Such a function 
is important to support the central government in 
accomplishing national priorities. Recently, 
understanding the important position of the 
province as the representative of the national 
government, under the new law on local gov-
ernment (Law No.23/2014), the role of the gov-
ernor is strengthened to support the achievement 
of the national priorities. 
b) Decentralization and the Bottom-up Process 
Decentralization basically places importance 
on the role of the local voice in deciding about 
local development; this is the essence of the 
bottom-up planning process. The closest insti-
tution to the local people is the village. Through 
the village, the local community’s needs are 
identified and are compiled. From the village, 
those needs are submitted to the districts and 
municipalities to be discussed at the provincial 
level. This shows the important role of the vil-
lage in the bottom-up planning process. Under-
standing the important role of the village, in 
2014 the Parliament agreed to issue the Village 
Law.  
c) Decentralization, Democracy and the Local 
Direct Elections 
The local direct election has placed impor-
tance on supporting local democracy in Indone-
sia. There are typically two types of cost in the 
process of election. The first cost is related to the 
administration of the election. Bringing as many 
voters as possible to the poll centers usually 
involves high administration costs. The second 
type of cost is related to the acceptance of the 
winner. When many voters come to the ballot, 
this can increase the public acceptance rate on 
the results of the election, hence reducing the 
social cost. It is clear that the costs move in the 
opposite direction. Economically, there should 
be a situation where there is optimizing of both 
costs of the elections that could lead to the 
minimum number of voters.  
The debate over the cost of local elections 
intensified which lead to their elimination. The 
system was replaced by indirect local elections 
through which the selection of the head of the 
local government was in the hands of the mem-
bers of the local parliament. This new system 
was rejected by the public, and following this 
public response, the local indirect election policy 
was terminated by using the government regula-
tion replacing the law. At present, Law No.1 of 
2015 which maintains the local direct elections 
has been issued by the parliament. This new law 
gives guidance to improve the process of local 
direct elections. 
These three factors have motivated the revi-
sion of the Law on Local Government and also 
the Law on Local Elections. In addition to those 
two laws, the acknowledgement of the village’s 
role in decentralization was supported by the 
Parliament through the issuance of the Village 
Law. This law stipulates the role and the stra-
tegic position of the village in the local devel-
opment in Indonesia. In addition to that, the law 
also establishes a village fund; this is a source of 
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funding for the village which is an integral part 
of the fiscal decentralization policy. Highlights 
of these current changes in law and regulation 
are described in the next sections. 
7.  A Revised Local Government Law 
The revised law on the local government 
(Law No.23/2014) addresses the following 
issues: 
1) A more comprehensive description about the 
division of responsibilities between the cen-
tral, province and district/municipal govern-
ments. 
2) The role of the Governor as the representative 
of the central government is strengthened. 
3) The improvement on the proliferation 
process. Under the new regulation, it does not 
give automatic status to a new local govern-
ment; instead the candidate should make 
better preparations first, and undergo an eval-
uation, before finally being accepted as a new 
local government. 
7.1. Division of the Government Affairs 
The Division of Responsibilities is addressed 
based on the principles of accountability, effi-
ciency, externalities and national strategic issues. 
Government responsibilities/affairs are divided 
into 3 (three) major types: the absolute central 
government affairs, the concurrent affairs, and 
the general affairs.  
It is important to balance the concurrent 
affairs between the central and the local gov-
ernment functions in the region in delivering 
public services to the local people. The absolute 
central government affairs, on the other hand, 
are the ultimate authority and the responsibility 
of the central government, including foreign 
affairs, justice, religion, defense, security, and 
monetary and fiscal policy. Finally, the general 
affairs are the sole repsonsibilty of the central 
government, and it relates to the building of na-
tional integrity. 
The issues of central-local governmental 
relations are addressed in the concurrent affairs, 
of which the responsibilities are divided between 
the three levels of government. These affairs 
consist of two types: (a) obligatory affairs, (b) 
non-obligatory (competitive) affairs. The obli-
gatory affairs include: education, health, general 
construction and spatial management, public 
housing, social affairs and local security. The 
non-obligatory affairs are activities chosen by 
each local government, based on the local com-
petence. The summary of the division of the 
government affairs can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Division of Government Affairs 
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The revised law on local government 
includes an attachment which comprehensively 
shows the division of responsibilities (for each 
obligatory and non-obligatory affair) between 
the three levels of the government. The previous 
Law No.32/2004 did not have such an attach-
ment; however, the division of responsibilities 
was stipulated in a separate government regula-
tion (Government Regulation No.38/2007). 
7.2. Role of the Governor 
The increased role of the Governor has 
become an issue in decentralized Indonesia. The 
Governor has a dual role; with autonomous 
power as well as a representation of the central 
government in the region. In the past, the role of 
the governor as the representation of the central 
government was not clearly addressed. The new 
law addresses significantly that, to act on the 
behalf of the central government, the Governor 
carries out monitoring and evaluation of the per-
formance of district/municipality. 
To carry out the above function, the Gover-
nor has some instruments, such as: ability to 
cancel (to abolish) the district/municipal reg-
ulation, giving rewards and penalties, acting as a 
mediator between conflicting districts, approval 
of local budgets, recommending the specific 
grant (DAK) for a certain activity in the region, 
and some ceremonial activities on behalf of the 
central government (for example; inaugurating 
the new head of district and also the new head of 
central government unit at the region). In addi-
tion to these, the governor can also propose the 
termination of the head of a district/municipality 
in a case where its parliament does not carry out 
its function. 
7.3. Local Government Proliferation 
Local government proliferation has become 
a very important issue during the fourteen years 
of Indonesian decentralization. Compared to 
other countries, the number of local governments 
in Indonesia is considered small, given the large 
size of the country. The problem with the crea-
tion of new local governments (proliferation) is 
not with their size, but rather with their perfor-
mance. 
According to the report of the MoHA 
(Ministry of Home Affairs), around 78% of the 
new local government failed to grow indepen-
dently (2013 MoHA report). Because of this bad 
performance, the new law addresses some tighter 
steps before allowing the creation of a new local 
government. A tighter regulation is implemented 
in relation to the creation of the new local gov-
ernment. Those points include the following: 
1. To create a new local government, there are 
two basic criteria: a) basic regional criteria, 
and b) basic capacity criteria. The basic 
regional criteria consist of minimum size of 
the area and the population, local border, the 
scope of region and the age of the local gov-
ernment. The capacity criteria are derived 
based on some indicators, which basically to 
prove that the new local government could 
survive and stays independently in the 
future. 
2. The proliferation could happen only if the 
region has fulfilled the following require-
ments: 
a. The candidate of the new Province should 
have at least 5 Districts 
b. The candidate of the new District should 
have at least 5 Sub-districts (“kecama-
tan”) 
c. The candidate of the new municipality 
should have at least 4 Sub-districts 
(“kecamatan”) 
d. In addition to that, the minimum age of 
the Province is 10 years to be prolife-
rated, while the minimum age of the dis-
trict/municipality is 7 years; all are cal-
culated from the year of the establishment 
of the local government. 
3. The local capacity of the new local govern-
ment needs to be assessed based on indica-
tors such as geography, demography, secu-
rity, socio-politic, economic potential, local 
finance and bureaucratic ability. 
4. The new law also addresses a significant 
change regarding the preparation steps of a 
new local government. Based on this, before 
obtaining a new local government status, the 
candidate should obtain first its status as a 
“prepared” region to allow a better prepara-
tion of the candidate to become the new 
local government. At the end, after a few 
years with this “prepared” status, this local 
government should pass the survival criteria, 
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which determined and evaluated by the cen-
tral government, in order to obtain its final 
status as a new local government. 
With the recent changes in regulation for 
proliferation, it is expected that the creation of 
the new local government can benefit local 
people to obtain better access and good quality 
of public services. Cases of bankrupted local 
governments hopefully can be avoided or mini-
mized, as the new regulation enforces a tighter 
rule for creating a new local government. 
8. Village Law 
Villages have already played an important 
role in supporting national programs. Along with 
this role, the central government also gives a 
commitment to develop better villages. In the 
past, such a commitment was followed by an 
allocation of village funding under a Presidential 
Instruction. Recently, the status of the village 
was clarified and strengthened by the issuing of 
the Village Law of 2014.  
Under this law, the definitions and regula-
tions pertaining to the existence of a village are 
clarified. The management of villages overall is 
under the control of the district or municipal 
government. The meaning of the term of 
“village” may be different by region, but it has 
the same meaning in terms of the entity. For 
example, a village is nationally known as “desa”, 
but the village in the West Sumatra is called as 
“nagari”. 
The law also stipulates the structure of the 
village government, which consists of the Head 
of the Village, supported by the technical units. 
The Head of Village is limited to the 6 (six) year 
term in office, and can be renewed to a maxi-
mum of 3 (three) times through the village elec-
tion. The Head of the Village receives a monthly 
fixed salary, allowances, and other incomes 
including the health insurance.  
There are some sources of village funding as 
stipulated in the Law. The main sources are as 
follows: 
a) Direct transfer from the central government. 
The aggregate transfer from the central gov-
ernment is in the amount of 10% of total 
transfer to local governments, but the 
amount itself is outside of the current total 
transfer to the local governments. 
b) A minimum of 10% of revenue owned by 
the district/municipalty (local taxes and user 
charges) must be dedicated for village 
funding. 
c) An allocation of a minimum of 10% of total 
transfer to the specific district (where the 
village located), excluding the specific grant 
(“DAK”). The money is directly transferred 
to the village. 
d) In addition to those above, a village could 
have its owned revenue (from village 
people), grants from third parties (without 
any commitment) and also financial assis-
tance when needed. 
To allocate the transfer from central gov-
ernment to the villages, the law has specified 
some criteria and also a formula accommodating 
some indicators, namely population, number of 
people living in poverty, land area and geo-
graphical difficulties index.  
According to the data from the Bureau of 
Statistics and the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
there are about 74,045 villages in Indonesia (see 
Table 6). The distribution of villages is depicted 
on a geographical map as shown in Figure 4. 
The issuance of the village law does not 
change the governance status of the village; it is 
still under the management of the district/muni-
cipality. However, as a community, the village is 
autonomous; it is allowed to have its own local 
election, to determine the new Head of the 
Village. 
The status of the village in Indonesia is dif-
ferent from the status of the village (barangay) 
in The Philippines, where the barangay is itself a 
local government. The village in Indonesia is not 
considered to be a local government; rather it is 
still an autonomous entity under the administra-
tion of municipal or district government. The 
Village Law, however, has made the position of 
the village stronger with certain functions and 
financial sources. In the future, the village could 
have the possibility of obtaining the status of a 
local government, similar to the barangay in the 
Philippines. 
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Table 6. Data on Provinces, Districts, Municipalities and Villages 
No Island Σ Prov Σ dist Σ Muni Σ Vil Area (km2) 
Population 
(people 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Sumatra 
Java 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
Mollucca 
Papua 
10 
6 
3 
5 
6 
2 
2 
120 
84 
37 
47 
70 
17 
40 
34 
29 
4 
9 
11 
4 
2 
22,910 
22,481 
4,560 
6,486 
8,635 
2,255 
6,718 
480,793.28 
129,438.28 
73,070.48 
544,150.07 
190,166.67 
78,896.53 
418,707.68 
56,874,456 
139,846,727 
14,579,150 
15,535,884 
19,984,495 
3,047,430 
4,957,892 
 Total 34 415 93 74,045 1,915,222.99 254,826,034 
Source: BPS and MoHA 
 
 
Source: BPS and MoHA 
Figure 4. Distribution of Villages across Provinces in Indonesia 
9. Local Direct Election 
Direct elections at the local level — or 
Pilkada — have been in place in Indonesia since 
June 2005. The Indonesian parliament in 2014 
passed a bill to end direct local elections, and 
replaced it with the indirect local election law. 
Members of parliament hac various arguments to 
support the idea of terminating local direct elec-
tion, particularly their high cost.  
Since there was strong public disagreement 
with regard to this policy, the outgoing President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued an emer-
gency presidential decree to overturn the deci-
sion and restore the local direct elections.  
In January 2015, the emergency presidential 
decree was accepted by the Parliament to 
become the law on local elections. Therefore, the 
current local direct election law is based on the 
emergency presidential decree, which covers 
issues such as reducing the cost of local direct 
election, eliminating black campaigns commonly 
conducted by candidates during the local elec-
tion process, and abolishing any use of the local 
budget (by incumbents) for the purpose of win-
ning the election. 
The next local elections in Indonesia were 
planned to be held on December 9, 2015. It 
would be the first local election conducted 
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simultaneously in one day. On one hand, these 
simultaneous local direct elections could reduce 
the high cost of elections; on the other hand, 
they meant that there was potential for political 
disorder if the government failed to maintain a 
peaceful election process. Therefore, to reduce 
the potential conflicts during simultaneous local 
elections, the government, particularly the Gen-
eral Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan 
Umum or KPU), should make better preparation 
as early as possible. 
9.1. Some Findings about Local Direct Elections 
The following are observations taken from 
the East Asia Forum (October 2014); which pro-
vide some highlights of the Indonesian local 
election: 
a) An estimate from the 2012 scholarly study 
shows that the average cost of holding an 
election in a district/municipality and a 
province amounts to about US$2.1 million 
and US$8.2 million respectively.  
b) Political decentralization via direct voting, in 
some cases, creates problems. Recent cases 
show that the networks of decentralized 
political dynasties exploit the Pilkada sys-
tem to their advantage. 
c) Local elections and greater regional auton-
omy was also driven by some local needs 
which are not accommodated nationally, 
such as those based on ethnicity or religion. 
d) On the other hand, the proponents of the 
Pilkada system in general believe that the 
gains in democratic capital more than make 
up for the inefficiencies of the system. While 
money politics and corruption remains a 
perennial scourge to any democratization 
and decentralization process, direct local 
elections on the whole have a stimulating ef-
fect on the economy. 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON DECEN-
TRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
It is not easy to predict the future of Indone-
sian decentralization. Political dynamics could 
shift the pendulum from decentralization back to 
centralization. Such a situation occurred last year 
when the decision to replace the local direct 
election system with a local indirect election 
system was accepted by the Parliament. Fortu-
nately, the process was cancelled, as the Presi-
dent issued an emergency regulation to restore 
the direct local election process. To prevent 
decentralization policy from being subjected to 
frequent changes, it is important for the govern-
ment to have a long term guideline on decentra-
lization policy. 
The future of decentralization policy de-
pends on its ability to support the implementa-
tion of national priorities, such as infrastructure 
development, climate change and also other 
national priorities. Clarity and certainty of the 
decentralization policy are important to support 
the accomplishment of national priorities. The 
future of decentralization policy also depends on 
the outcome of the policy, particularly to what 
extent the policy has helped to improve local 
welfare.  
To minimize frequent changes to decentrali-
zation policy, the government is urged to have a 
grand design for decentralization. This strategy 
is useful to keep the policy on the right tracks, 
and consistently to support the future develop-
ment of Indonesia. At present, only a grand 
design for fiscal decentralization is available. 
This grand design focusses not only on the reve-
nue side, but also on the expenditure side of the 
local government budget. 
Under this grand strategy, the future scheme 
of local revenue and expenditure are formulated 
based on the future needs. The local revenue is 
expected to be stronger, buoyant and efficient. 
Under Law No.28/2009, locally generated reve-
nue was empowered with property tax which is 
known as a good local tax. In the future, the 
piggy-backing of national taxes, namely per-
sonal income tax, is under a consideration to 
increase the locally controlled revenue. 
The grand strategy of fiscal decentralization 
also places importance on the expenditure side, 
particularly on the effectiveness and the effi-
ciency of the local spending. Based on the 
present evidence, local government budgets still 
focus mainly on spending on salaries. The grand 
design of fiscal decentralization encourages an 
increase of local spending on capital, in particu-
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lar for building local infrastructure. In addition, 
the grand design of fiscal decentralization also 
recommends the implementation of MTEF (the 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework) for 
accommodating long-term investment in local 
budgets. Finally, to help the fulfillment of the 
national priorities, a specific grant (DAK) needs 
to be increased significantly over the years. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 
Based on the evaluation of current decentra-
lization, the paper highlights some findings: 
• Regional economic growth and HDI show 
improvement in the welfare of local people. 
This improvement is not necessarily the 
result of the decentralization, however, given 
that some improvements in the budget allo-
cation, particularly increasing the portion of 
budget spending on education and health, but 
there is evidence that the welfare improve-
ment is a result of decentralization. 
• Other public services, mainly public infra-
structure, have also increased over time, after 
decentralization. Unfortunately, the data 
show a lack of maintenance of this public 
infrastructure, namely road facilities. This 
might give the wrong impression that not 
much has been done in practical terms toward 
the availability of the infrastructure across 
Indonesia. 
• A cording to current observations, people are 
still in favor of local direct elections. This 
system makes people able to choose their best 
leader to guide them towards prosperity. 
• For a long history, the allocation of produc-
tive investment is distributed unequally 
across Indonesia, which results in a relatively 
higher portion of GDP for Java and Sumatra. 
In the future, an affirmative intervention is 
needed to reduce this interregional disparity. 
Recently, there have been some efforts to 
amend the law. The law on local government has 
been revised to include better division of 
government affairs between the levels of gov-
ernment. It is a challenge for the government to 
use this new guideline for practical purposes. 
There are always potential conflicts between 
central and local governments when discussing 
detailed issues related to programs and activities. 
To reduce the potential conflict, further technical 
regulations are needed, and those should be 
made available as soon as possible. 
The new law also changes the process of 
proliferation which requires much better prepa-
ration steps to create a new local government. In 
the past, the motivation of the proliferation did 
not always come from the central government, 
but more often it came from the parliament. 
Since the endorsement of proliferation under the 
new law requires more technical evaluation, it is 
recommended that in the future, the initiative of 
proliferation only comes first from the central 
government, and submitted to the Parliament for 
discussion and approval. 
Fiscal decentralization could improve local 
financial management to make it more account-
able. In addition to this, fiscal decentralization 
policy could also help the achievement of 
national priorities, by enhancing the instrument 
of fiscal decentralization policy such as the spe-
cific grant of DAK. Such important progress has 
been accommodated in the upcoming National 
Budget Planning. To maintain stability and cer-
tainty for the new policy, it is suggested that the 
new direction of fiscal decentralization could be 
incorporated in the new Central-Local Fiscal 
Balance Bill, which is expected to be issued in 
2016. 
Finally, to guide the future of the decentrali-
zation policy, the government could make a 
road-map or a grand design. At present, the the 
only one available is for fiscal decentralization. 
In order to guide the future decentralization 
policy, it is recommended that the government to 
formulate a comprehensive grand design to 
incorporate not only fiscal, but also non-fiscal 
issues of decentralization. 
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